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The ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for Victims of Cyclone Nargis (AHTF) expresses its deep gratitude and sincere appreciation to all 
those who collaborated with us in the coordinated effort to alleviate the 
suffering of survivors of Cyclone Nargis. 
We thank the Government of the Union of Myanmar for its guidance 
and leadership in assisting the people of Myanmar during the relief and 
recovery response. We are also grateful to the United Nations agencies, 
international and national organisations and all others who contributed 
to post-Nargis relief and recovery activities.
We thank the ASEAN Member States for their unwavering support 
during such a critical juncture. Our experiences over the course of the 
Task Force’s two-year mandate are certain to shape ASEAN’s approach to 
disaster management and humanitarian relief for generations to come.
It is due to our collective efforts that two years after Cyclone Nargis 
we now see signs of recovery in Myanmar’s Ayeyarwady Delta. Rice 
farmers plant seeds where rice fields once stood fallow, brand new 
school-cum-cyclone shelters dot the landscape and bamboo plants and 
mangrove bushes are sprouting up around the once devastated areas.
This book is dedicated to the survivors of Cyclone Nargis, whose 
strength, courage and resilience in the face of unimaginable adversity 
is at once humbling and inspiring and, no doubt, will spur the ongoing 
recovery effort in the months ahead.
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Death, destruction and despair followed in the path of Cyclone Nargis. As news spread that the Cyclone had flattened entire villages, killing or injuring hundreds of thousands of people, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) felt compelled, out of a sense of compassion, urgency and 
fraternity, to support one of our Member States. The ASEAN community immediately reached out to help 
Myanmar recover from the worst natural disaster in the country’s recorded history.
The complexity of the emerging tragedy called for a cohesive and coordinated plan. ASEAN was urged 
to take the lead. Never before had we undertaken such an ambitious and large-scale undertaking. But 
buttressed by the Government of Myanmar and the international community, ASEAN’s confidence grew and 
our association was “baptised” by the Cyclone that wreaked havoc on one of our Member States.
Cyclone Nargis occurred at a pivotal time, when ASEAN Member States were embracing the ASEAN Charter 
and the association was striving to become a more collective, dynamic and inclusive entity. The disaster 
provided ASEAN with a window of opportunity to make meaningful progress on the goals of the Charter to 
bring ASEAN closer to the people, enhance the well-being and livelihood of ASEAN peoples, and alleviate 
poverty and narrow development gaps through close cooperation with the Government of Myanmar.
Experience from Nargis demonstrates that ASEAN, with support from partners, can strengthen disaster risk 
reduction among Member States and provide an effective coordinating mechanism to facilitate the delivery 
of international assistance in a Member State during the post-disaster relief and recovery process. Our 
collective response in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis is an example of the benefits that broader integration 
and closer partnerships can yield.
ASEAN’s response to Nargis, in cooperation and collaboration with the United Nations, the international 
humanitarian community and civil society, helped ease the pain and suffering that the Cyclone inflicted 
on people living in Ayeyarwady and Yangon Divisions of Myanmar. Since the region as a whole is prone to 
disasters, it is imperative, particularly as we reach the end of the mandate of the ASEAN-led coordination 
mechanism in Myanmar, to document and disseminate the lessons ASEAN has learned in the wake of Nargis.
This publication describes the unprecedented and groundbreaking assortment of monitoring and 
assessment activities that were carried out in response to the Cyclone, many of which have already had an 
impact on disaster response efforts in other parts of the world.
Through this publication, we wish to share within and across the region what we have gained from our 
experience carrying out ASEAN’s first-ever large-scale humanitarian operation in a Member State. It is our 
sincere hope that our lessons will be of service to others and our best practices replicated in the event of 
future disasters.
Foreword by the Secretary-General of ASEAN
SURIN PITSUWAN
Just after Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Myanmar on 2 and 3 May 2008, the 
Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), Dr Surin Pitsuwan, called on 
all Member States to provide urgent relief assistance 
through the framework of the ASEAN Agreement 
on Disaster Management and Emergency Response 
(AADMER). A few days later, the Government of the 
Union of Myanmar agreed to work in coordination 
with the ASEAN Secretariat to assemble and deploy 
an ASEAN-Emergency Rapid Assessment Team 
(ERAT), made up of Government officials and disaster 
management experts from ASEAN Member States.
In the first ever such mission for ASEAN, the 
ASEAN-ERAT was deployed to Myanmar from 9 to 
18 May 2008. Its report was submitted to the Special 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 19 May 2008 
in Singapore. At the meeting, the Foreign Ministers 
agreed to establish an ASEAN-led coordinating 
mechanism to “facilitate the effective distribution 
and utilisation of assistance from the international 
community, including the expeditious and effective 
deployment of relief workers, especially health and 
medical personnel.”
The result was a two-tiered structure, consisting of 
the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for the Victims 
of Cyclone Nargis (AHTF), and a Yangon-based 
Tripartite Core Group (TCG), consisting of ASEAN, 
the Government and the United Nations (UN), 
to facilitate day-to-day operations and oversee 
coordination.
The constructive solution that was worked out, 
that of a tripartite structure involving ASEAN, the 
UN and the Government, turned out to be not only 
a successful formula for ensuring access, but also an 
effective forum for achieving a close and productive 
relationship with the authorities. This did not exist to 
the same degree before Nargis. 
As a result, there was significantly more 
humanitarian space in the Delta than in any other 
Chapter One 
Introduction
A mother comforts her 
children after Cyclone 
Nargis. Photo courtesy 
of WFP
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part of the country, and the TCG played a key role in securing 
this. This is relevant for Myanmar, as it paved the way for access 
for information collection in a country where otherwise little 
was known. All assessments and monitoring exercises were 
conducted with full access permitted by the Government. This 
was almost unprecedented for Myanmar.
This book documents the types of assessments and 
monitoring exercises that were carried out under the auspices 
of the AHTF and TCG, including the deployment of the 
ASEAN-ERAT; the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) 
consisting of the Village Tract Assessment (VTA) and the 
Damage and Loss Assessment (DALA); the Periodic Review (PR) 
monitoring assessments that followed the PONJA; and the 
Social Impact Monitoring (SIM) studies. It also includes a section 
on the Recovery Information Accountability System (RIAS), 
which tracks funding streams from pledges to outputs received 
during the Post-Nargis and Regional Partnership Conference 
(PONAC) on 25 November 2009.
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Figure 1: The Four Phases of Post-Disaster Assessment1
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Figure 2: Post-Cyclone Nargis Assessments Progressed 
through the Whole Monitoring and Evaluation Cycle
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As shown in Figure 1, there are four distinct phases that 
are generally accepted for data collection and analysis, with 
different foci and methods, following a sudden-onset crisis. 
Using this internationally accepted standard as the guide, the 
TCG needs and monitoring assessments closely correlated with 
these recommended assessments (see Figure 2).
Each assessment either built on a previous one (for example, 
the PR built on the VTA), or they complemented each other 
(such as the PR and SIM assessments that were conducted 
in parallel). The ASEAN-ERAT focused on life saving and/or 
life-sustaining needs. Thus, this rapid assessment generated 
the basic information needed for decisions to be made on initial 
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life-saving responses in all critical sectors, notably food, health, 
nutrition, shelter and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). 
Other sectors that were not immediately life saving were not 
prioritised at this stage.
The PONJA provided more detailed, basic data relevant 
for all sectors, based on larger and more representative 
samples. It established a baseline for future monitoring and 
complemented the more in-depth sector-specific assessments 
that followed. Continual monitoring assessments, such as the 
PRs and the SIMs, served to monitor and measure progress or 
lack thereof.
As all these products were conducted on behalf of the entire 
humanitarian community in Myanmar, it was essential for the 
assessment process to take into consideration the audience. 
The PONJA and the PR assessments were good examples of 
involving the wider community in order to achieve a sense of 
ownership with the final products and to ensure the reports 
were appropriate and technically accurate. This consultative 
process was facilitated by the fact that the humanitarian 
community was organised in Clusters that, during the recovery 
period, became Working Groups. The Cluster approach is an 
established UN coordination system that was formed after 
a weak operational response to the crisis in Darfur in 2004 
and 2005, and is now a standard system worldwide. Whereas, 
the Working Groups were a Myanmar-specific coordinating 
mechanism for recovery phase activities, which were formed 
out of the Clusters (see Figure 3) as recommended by the 
PONREPP.     asean
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Emergency Rapid Assessment 
Team
Through the framework of the AADMER, ASEAN Member States could help a 
disaster-affected country like Myanmar to conduct 
assessments and to decide on the type and scope of 
assistance required. ASEAN decided to activate the 
AADMER when Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar.
Following the recommendation made by the 
ASEAN Secretariat in its daily situation reports, the 
Myanmar Government agreed to the deployment 
of the ASEAN-ERAT. The team that was made up 
of Government officials and disaster management 
experts from ASEAN Member States who were 
tasked with determining the type and scope of 
assistance required. Specifically, the key objective of 
the ASEAN-ERAT mission was to gather and analyse 
assessment findings through consultations with 
senior Government officials and field assessments 
in order to provide recommendations on the 
way forward in addressing the support for the 
Government.
In the first such mission for ASEAN, the 
ASEAN-ERAT was rapidly deployed to Myanmar 
from 9 to 18 May. It was the first official assessment 
team outside the country that came to Myanmar 
post-Cyclone Nargis. Its report was submitted to the 
Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 19 May 
and became a reference for the Foreign Ministries 
to define the approach that ASEAN should take to 
facilitate the humanitarian assistance.
ASEAN organised, constituted and deployed for the 
first time the ASEAN-ERAT with representatives from 
Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore 
and the ASEAN Secretariat. In addition, members of 
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs and UN Disaster Assessment 
and Coordination (UNDAC) team served as resource 
persons. Many of the ASEAN-ERAT members were 
Chapter Two
Assessment
Advance ERAT team 
planning for PONJA 
assessment
in the Delta 7 June 2008. 
Photo courtesy of the
advance ERAT team
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The team jointly developed the final report for the Special 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 19 May, in which it 
proposed the establishment of a “Humanitarian Coalition for 
the Victims of Cyclone Nargis” to coordinate and facilitate the 
ongoing relief, recovery and future reconstruction efforts. This 
was later known as the ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism.
Summary
The findings of the ASEAN-ERAT led to a recommendation to 
establish a mechanism for post-Nargis response in Myanmar 
in which ASEAN would be at the forefront of bridging the 
humanitarian gap between the affected community and the 
international humanitarian community. The ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers, who established the ASEAN-led coordinating 
mechanism and set up the AHTF, endorsed the team’s 
recommendations. The AHTF later established the TCG.
also UNDAC-trained, which facilitated their interaction with 
the UN system in Myanmar. The team consisted of experts 
in humanitarian coordination, water and sanitation, health, 
logistics and food, amongst others.
The ASEAN-ERAT worked over 10 days from 9 to 18 May 
(see Figure 4). Working closely with the UNDAC team using 
their available tools and questionnaires, the team interviewed 
key Government representatives, such as the Minister and 
senior officials from the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and 
Resettlement, used findings and field reports from the Myanmar 
Information Management Unit (MIMU), and consulted with the 
Clusters. The team made short field visits to Nargis-affected 
areas in the Delta and in Yangon. The ASEAN-ERAT mission 
gathered and analysed assessment findings, and through 
consultation with senior Government officials, provided 
recommendations on support for the Government.
ASEAN-ERAT, together with the UNDAC team, at the UN building on 18 May 2008 after finishing the report to 
be presented to the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Singapore. Photo by AHTF Coordinating Office
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The team’s findings successfully advocated for the 
Government to allow the international humanitarian 
community access to the Delta to provide immediate, medium- 
and long-term activities in response to Cyclone Nargis, with 
needs ranging from agriculture, early recovery, education, 
food, health, logistics, nutrition, protection, shelter, and water 
sanitation and hygiene.
The first deployment of the ASEAN-ERAT demonstrated the 
value of using the AADMER as the guide for ASEAN’s role in 
future humanitarian crisis in the region. Based on the AADMER, 
the affected Member State will continue to take the lead, and 
ASEAN’s response will be mobilised based on the request and 
consent of the affected Member State and will vary depending 
on the capacity of the country and severity and complexity 
of the disaster. ASEAN’s regional mechanisms should work 
hand-in-hand with the affected Government, supporting it 
in responding to the disaster. This principle was consistently 
followed throughout the two-year humanitarian operation.
Challenge: The decision to establish the ASEAN-ERAT was 
made in March 2008 before Cyclone Nargis. Therefore, at 
the time of Nargis, the ASEAN-ERAT essentially was not yet 
established. However, in view of the pressure and the need 
for a better description of the situation in the field, ASEAN 
activated the ASEAN-ERAT by calling on government officials 
and disaster management experts from ASEAN Member States 
to gather in 48 hours. The team successfully completed its 
mission with solid recommendations that subsequently proved 
to be the turning point for the establishment of an ASEAN-led 
coordinating mechanism. But this first-ever joint assessment 
mission encountered many operational challenges, which 
could have been sorted out easier if the ASEAN-ERAT had been 
properly set up, equipped and trained before the deployment. 
Another challenge was the necessity for the ASEAN-ERAT 
to interface with other systems, such as the UNDAC and 
other humanitarian actors. An absence of guidelines and 
procedures necessitated improvisation and maneuvering by the 
ASEAN-ERAT team during the mission.
Recommendation: Procedures for activation and 
mobilisation, deployment, rapid assessment, on-site 
coordination, reporting and demobilisation must be properly 
developed and provided to the ASEAN-ERAT. Training and 
appropriate refresher courses ought to be carried out by any 
ASEAN-ERAT members. The team should also be self-sufficient 
and possess the skills necessary to support and produce solid 
recommendations to the affected country. Interface with 
UNDAC, UNIASC and other humanitarian actors will also have to 
be figured out. All of the above ought to be in place prior to any 
future deployment.  
Lesson Learned:  Based on the experience of working 
together, ASEAN and UN have already begun to develop 
standard operating procedures on how the two organisations 
can better cooperate with each other and complement one 
another in terms of assessment as well as preparedness and 
response. ASEAN has also begun to develop the required 
procedures, training modules and exercises to equip 
ASEAN-ERAT for future deployments. ASEAN-ERAT members 
have also been participating in UNDAC training opportunities. 
Conducting an ERAT Assessment:  
A Practical Reference
The ASEAN-ERAT assessment should be conducted 
approximately within 1 to 10 days of a disaster. However, in line 
with the AADMER, the deployment should take place, ideally, 
within 24 hours of activation, in view of the proximity of the 
countries from which team members are coming. It should 
gather first-hand information for ASEAN to make informed 
decisions to help the affected country towards the road to 
recovery and should aim to support the affected country in 
facilitating the coordination of initial assessments of both the 
emergency situation and the international relief requirements 
stemming from it. Specifically, it should focus on ensuring 
the consistency of any preliminary information regarding the 
nature and scale of the emergency, the preliminary needs 
assessed and the relief interventions required.
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The team should aim to understand the impact of the event 
and identify immediate needs with a limited range of indicators 
and core questions. Data collection methods should be adapted 
to the short timeframe, such as performing key informant 
interviews and community-level discussions. Members of an 
ASEAN-ERAT mission typically take about two weeks to gather 
preliminary information. The team should aim to ensure that 
field visits start as soon as possible after arrival.
The team is selected in order to ensure balanced experience 
within the team for the three broad areas of disaster response 
framework, emergency services, and early warning and public 
education.
As far as possible, members should be from the geographical 
region in which the requesting country is located. There should 
be at least three people with good writing and editing skills, 
one administrative staff person and a team member with 
legal knowledge on each team. If the team decides to have 
sub-teams, a Terms of Reference (ToR) should be prepared for 
each sub-team, along with a list of questions each team would 
like to ask within the country.
An appropriate schedule for the team’s activities should 
be drawn up before the team arrives in country. This should 
cover meetings with the National Focal Point, who is the entity 
designed and authorised by the affected country to receive 
and transmit information pursuant to the provision of AADMER. 
The National Focal Point should coordinate with the competent 
authorities and serves as the single point of contact for the 
country it represents.
The ASEAN-ERAT should conduct the assessment, prepare 
and submit an interim assessment report within 24 hours upon 
arrival at the disaster site based on the data collected, made 
available or from on-site assessments and interviews. After it 
is approved by the National Focal Point, the full assessment 
report should be sent to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for 
Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) 
within 72 hours of arrival.
The principle objective of the ASEAN-ERAT rapid assessment 
is to quickly provide a “snapshot” assessment of the immediate 
disaster situation, and to identify how and where immediate 
assistance should be prioritised in order to have the greatest 
impact.
Collection of information should include both primary 
and secondary sources. The team should first meet with the 
government focal points for disaster management in order 
to understand their perspective. It is important to review 
the government’s strategy to mobilise external resources to 
assist in strengthening its capacity and to review the country’s 
capability to put these strategies into place.
The team should also endeavour to meet concerned 
government departments and institutions that have a part to 
play in national disaster management and with all UN agencies 
in-country, perhaps by organising a meeting with IASC 
member agencies and donors, especially those with projects 
concerned with disaster management.
The team must undertake field visits, as appropriate. It is best 
to commence field visits as quickly as possible as they are time 
consuming. Following each interview and/or field visit, a report 
should be immediately produced. The report should strive to 
be direct and to-the-point.
The rapid assessment should cover multiple areas including 
the need for international search and rescue teams, medical 
needs, drinking water, sanitation, food, shelter and any other 
identified areas related to survival. Other sectors that were not 
immediately life saving do not need to be prioritised at this 
stage.
The team must meet daily, both in the morning before 
starting its work and in the evening when everyone has 
returned. This enables the team to collectively keep abreast 
of developments on all issues, to jointly analyse new findings, 
and to ensure all members are aligned as to their day-to-day 
understanding of the evolving situation. The team should try 
to establish contact with the UNDAC team and discuss the 
possibility of integrating or distributing, as appropriate, various 
roles and functions during assessment and coordination.
The images were captured by the ASEAN-ERAT 
during its first mission in the Delta. Photos by 
AHTF Coordinating Office
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The ASEAN-ERAT should focus on the emergency phase, 
which normally lasts two to four weeks from the start of the 
disaster.
There should be an exit strategy, which should be included in 
the initial Plan of Action. Arrangements should be made with 
the National Focal Point and competent authorities to hand 
over the team’s functions, assets and processes before ending 
the mission.
Post-Nargis Joint Assessment
At the ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference on 25 
May 2008 in Yangon, donors made it clear that an assessment 
would be vital to secure important funding, as the whole 
picture of the Cyclone’s damage was still unclear at the time. 
Furthermore, it would ensure that everyone was clear about the 
impact of Cyclone Nargis and what needed to be done.
During the first TCG meeting on 31 May 2008, it was agreed 
that a needs assessment would be conducted to determine the 
immediate and long-term effects of Cyclone Nargis on affected 
communities, and the requirements for humanitarian assistance 
and for medium- to long-term recovery. This assessment 
became known as the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA).
As the PONJA was such an important and major undertaking, 
the TCG formed a three-person Assessment Oversight 
Committee (AOC), led by a UN specialist in multi-sectoral 
inter-agency assessments who was seconded to ASEAN. The 
Committee included a representative from the Government 
and the UN. The AOC was given the responsibility of integrating 
the needs assessment conducted at the micro, household level, 
known as the Village Tract Assessment (VTA2), with the sector 
and macro-level Damage and Loss Assessment (DALA).
The VTA uses various tools including questionnaires where 
the respondents were heads of households and community 
Secretary-General of ASEAN Dr Surin Pitsuwan addresses the ASEAN Roundtable for PONJA, witnessed by 
Dr Noeleen Heyzer, Under Secretary-General of the UN, Executive Secretary UNESCAP and U Kyaw Thu, TCG 
Chair on 24 June 2008 in Yangon. Photo by AHTF Coordinating Office
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key informants, as well as focus group discussions (using 
groups of men, women, and fishermen or farmers) and 
observation checklists. The DALA methodology, on the 
other hand, provides a framework to identify and quantify 
the socio-economic and environmental impact of natural 
disasters. It is based on the utilisation of the system of 
national accounts of the affected country as a means for 
valuation of the damage and the losses caused by the 
disaster
Therefore, the PONJA’s aims were to assess: (i) the 
current vulnerabilities and needs of the population living; 
(ii) the damage done to major assets; and (iii) the losses of 
income. 
Figure 4 shows the progression of key events that led up 
to the completion of the PONJA.
The PONJA was an extraordinary and pioneering 
opportunity for different parties to work together towards 
achieving a collaborative approach to needs assessment.
The Government was a key participant of the 
assessment process, and the Chair of the TCG was 
afforded a great deal of autonomy to manage matters, 
which worked very well as this helped to speed up 
decision-making and increased the credibility of the TCG.  
The Government was involved throughout all stages of 
the PONJA exercise. For example, more than 50 officials 
from 18 ministries supported the assessments and report 
writing processes. Furthermore, the Government eased 
access to the affected areas and provided some transport 
and vital communications equipment.
The UN coordinated the participation of its agencies 
and other NGO members of the IASC, including in the 
formation of field teams and through consultations with 
the technical Clusters. The UN coordinated all aspects of 
the VTA, with additional guidance from ASEAN, including 
data gathering, analysis, and report writing. It played a key 
role in ensuring that the VTA’s findings fed into the revised 
Flash Appeal that was launched less than two weeks 
Dr Johannah Wegerdt, VTA Coordinator and PR 
Programme Coordinator,  addresses the audience at a 
Welcome Back PONJA team ceremony. Photo by AHTF 
Coordnating Office
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before the launch of the PONJA report. Finally, it coordinated 
with the MIMU to support the VTA, particularly in the mapping 
and spatial analysis work.
ASEAN coordinated the Damage and Loss Assessment (DALA) 
with support from the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). The World Bank deployed approximately 30 staff 
and ADB deployed a further 9 staff. ASEAN also deployed 
for the second time ASEAN-ERAT members from Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand to join the 
PONJA teams.
All the above parties met daily to discuss progress in the 
relief and recovery efforts, and to get daily up-dates on the 
assessments taking place. Under the TCG umbrella, the PONJA 
was truly a multi-party exercise.
VTA: Methods
As shown by Figure 5, the VTA took four weeks to complete 
and be combined in the PONJA Report, which was launched 
two weeks later.
With oversight from the three-member AOC formed by the 
TCG, a core team of eight managed the operational work of the 
VTA. This team included a Programme Manager, a Technical 
Coordinator/Operational Manager (an epidemiologist), two 
Statisticians, two Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
Specialists, a Database Manager and a Logistician. 
Teams were deployed on 3 June 2008 for 11 consecutive days. 
To monitor the movement of the teams and ensure their safety, 
the TCG set up a 24-hour “Control Room” manned by ASEAN 
volunteers, officials from ASEAN embassies in Yangon, experts 
from the UN and Government officials from key line ministries. 
TCG members held daily meetings every morning in the Control 
Room to ensure that the assessment was on track. The Control 
Room also responded to reports from the assessment teams in 
the field who found some areas that were not yet reached by 
aid workers/assistance, and relayed the reports to the TCG.
Before the deployment, an advance team was sent to the 
ground to assess the logistic and security conditions for the 
upcoming teams. Field teams consisted of 31 four-member 
teams who surveyed 2500 respondents in 291 villages across 
30 townships. Each team had one team leader. There was a 
rapid training session for the field personnel and some rapid 
planning to establish the basic logistical capacity to support the 
survey.
Start of the Training
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Advanced Reconnaissance Teams
Pilot Survey
Field Deployment
Preliminary Findings
Data-entry and Data Analysis
Final VTA Input to PONJA Report
Flash Appeal Revision Launch
Presentation of the Final PONJA Report
Final PONJA Report Release
Figure 5: Timeline of Events for the VTA
Source: PONJA report
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The analysis team, composed of Statisticians, GIS Specialists 
and a Technical Coordinator (epidemiologist), worked closely 
with focal point persons from each of the Clusters in order to 
ensure correct and appropriate analysis and interpretation. The 
VTA, like the DALA, worked with the structured Cluster system 
to conduct consultations, as all active agencies under the IASC 
working in the Delta, including the partner Government line 
ministries, participated in this coordination mechanism.
In the final report writing stage, the AOC consulted with a 
group proclaimed the “Eminent Persons,” who were four senior 
Myanmar persons who played a very critical role in assisting 
with interpreting the results, without changing the substance of 
the findings of the assessment.
Sub-national centres, referred to as Hubs, were created in 
the affected areas by the UN to assist in operational activities 
responding to the devastation left by Cyclone Nargis. The 
Enumerator teams used the Hubs, located in Bogale, Labutta, 
Pathein, Pyapon, Wakema, and Yangon Townships, as a base. 
International staff members that were seconded from the UN 
and international NGOs (INGOs) were relocated to the Hubs for 
the assessment period. They were required to liaise with the 
local Government, and prepare for the incoming PONJA teams.
The PONJA demonstrated the value of having a stronger 
field coordination mechanism and after the initial assessment 
period was complete in August 2008, the TCG approved the 
establishment of joint coordination hubs consisting of staff 
from both ASEAN and the UN. This arrangement of cost-sharing 
facilitated ASEAN to quickly establish an operational presence 
in the affected area that were later used successfully for the 
implementation of the Periodic Reviews.
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The existence of the Hubs greatly facilitated the complex 
logistics of covering a large area with many Enumerators and 
assessment officers. To prepare for the challenges of moving 
the teams around efficiently and to schedule, logistical plans 
were made in advance. Agreements for logistical support 
from locally active agencies and Government authorities were 
clarified and agreed on prior to the fieldwork. Tough terrain 
and conditions during the monsoon period meant that a wide 
variety of transport was used (helicopter, boat, motorbike, 
trishaws and car). The teams were trained to use appropriate 
telecommunication tools and Geographical Positioning Systems 
(GIS).
The chosen assessment sampling method was based on the 
following rationale:
•	 The aims of the assessment were to cover all 30 affected 
townships;
•	 The assessment needed to address the nature of the 
disaster, by the fact that it was unlikely there would be 
homogeneity within townships.
For this reason, a spatial sampling frame was used with a 
Panel Study design that justified periodic assessments looking 
at the trends over time, rather than changes at the household 
level.
The VTA selected 30 affected townships from the 
Government’s list of affected townships according to an 
appropriate definition for the assessment. The 30 townships 
assessed by the VTA were included in the 57 townships 
surveyed in the DALA.
The VTA used a centric systematic area sample method to 
identify Probability Sampling Units. The method involved 
dividing the assessment area into non-overlapping squares 
(quadrats) of equal area (15km by 15km) and assessing the 
community or communities located closest to the centre of 
each quadrat. GIS was used in combination with sketch maps 
to locate communities that met the selection criteria. Figure 6 
shows the artificial grid that was used for sampling. It marks the 
location of each community that was assessed.
The assessment tool combined key questions from 10 Clusters 
and sub-Clusters: Agriculture, Early Recovery, Education, 
Emergency Shelter, Food, Health, Nutrition, Protection of 
Women and Children, Temporary Settlements, and WASH. The 
questionnaires underwent translation and back translation by 
independent translators twice and were evaluated in the pilot 
survey.
The data collection methods used in each village visit comprised 
of 10 household survey interviews, six key informant interviews 
interviewing up to six different informants, three focus group 
discussions (women, men and fishermen or farmers) and one 
observation checklist. Key informants included school teachers, 
monks or other religious leaders, village leaders, Government 
officials, the heads of women’s groups where they existed, and 
health professionals.
All responses were recorded on paper. Double data-entry took 
12 days and 25 personnel running simultaneously with the data 
collection. Confidentiality standard operating procedures were 
followed to ensure the data was not interfered with in transit from 
the village to the Hub and onwards to data headquarters, and 
during the photocopying of original documents.
The analysis took around 12 days, being conducted concurrently 
with the data collection and the data-entry. The analysis stage 
involved the Statisticians, GIS Specialist and the Epidemiologist 
consulting with the technical Cluster specialists and later, with the 
DALA team.
DALA: Methods
The assessment of damage and losses after disasters is essential 
for the estimation of financial needs for recovery. Priorities are 
defined in terms of the most affected sectors of the economy, 
geographical areas of the country and population groups to 
be attended during recovery. Furthermore, the assessment of 
damage and losses provides a quantitative basis to monitor 
progress in the execution of post-disaster programmes.
Some of the key figures involved in ASEAN’s monitoring and assessment included (clockwise, from 
top left): Mr. Yves Kim Creac’h, then VTA Programme Manager, Ms. Adelina Kamal, then Head 
of AHTF Coordinating Office and Head of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance 
Division of ASEAN Secretariat, Dr. Puji Pujiono, senior UNDP official seconded to ASEAN, Dr. Anish 
Kumar Roy, then Special Representative for Secretary-General of ASEAN in Myanmar in 2008
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The DALA methodology provides for the estimation of the destruction of assets caused by 
the disaster, changes in the flows of the economy caused by the temporary absence of the 
destroyed assets, and modifications in the performance of the affected economy. In addition, it 
also provides the basis for assessing the negative impact on personal or household income and 
overall well-being.
Damage is defined as the monetary value of fully or partially destroyed assets. It is initially 
assumed that assets will be replaced to the same condition – in quantity and quality – that they 
had prior to the disaster. Losses are defined as the changes in the flows of goods and services 
that will not be forthcoming until the destroyed assets are rebuilt, over the span of time that 
elapses from the occurrence of the disaster and the end of the recovery period. Losses include 
production of goods and services that will not be obtained; higher costs of operation and 
production, and the cost of the humanitarian assistance activities. Total disaster effects are the 
sum of damage and losses.
Macro-economic effects are defined as the manner in which the disaster modifies the 
performance of the main macro-economic aggregates in the affected country or region. These 
effects arise from the damage and losses caused by the disaster. Macro-economic effects 
represent a different view of disaster impact – as they describe the effects of the disaster on the 
functioning of the economy and the resulting macro-economic imbalances – and are therefore 
not added to the sum of damage and losses to avoid double accounting.
Main macro-economic effects include the impact on the level and growth of the gross 
domestic product of the country or region affected by the disaster; the modification of the 
normal pattern and structure of the balance of trade due to increased imports and lower 
exports of goods and services arising from the disaster; and the corresponding impact on the 
fiscal sector that may occur due to lower revenues and higher expenditures of the government. 
The post-disaster macro-economic analysis also includes an examination of the impact on 
gross investment to take into consideration the investments to be made during the recovery, 
the examination of possible inflation stemming from the effects of the disaster, and negative 
impacts on employment and income at the personal and household or family level.
The DALA followed the timeline displayed in Figure 7.
The DALA team consisted of around 80 personnel in total, including over 35 Government 
officials, ASEAN-ERAT members, and technical specialists from the World Bank, UN organisations 
and the ADB. There were two team leaders (from the World Bank and ADB).  One Government 
representative was designated to facilitate information and data collection. Each DALA 
sector team worked with a focal point from each Cluster and consulted widely with national 
stakeholders and international partners.
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Figure 6: Map of the Cyclone Nargis-Affected Area with Quadrats Overlaid
Source: PONJA report
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baseline information and of data on damages provided by the 
Government through its different technical and service delivery 
ministries and offices. Immediately after, the DALA team carried 
out plausibility reviews of the data, including triangulation and 
independent verification of the data.
Baseline data was time-normalised across various sectors 
of the economy to provide the best possible reference for the 
analysis. This included desk reviews of information and the 
identification of information gaps and the possible sources for 
filling them, as well as detailed field surveys of the affected 
areas where extensive consultations were held with inter alia 
township officials, community leaders and representatives, 
NGOs, villagers, business owners and other stakeholders.
Six DALA field teams of about 65 persons in total were 
deployed to the most disaster-affected townships of the 
southern Delta on 11 June for a period of five to six days. For 
the purpose of the field visit, which served to collect primary 
data and validate secondary data, the teams were grouped 
to cover the following sectors: education, health, housing; 
agriculture, livestock, fisheries and irrigation; industry and 
commerce; transport and communications; electricity and water 
and sanitation; and social and environmental issues and coastal 
zone management. As with the VTA, a wide variety of transport 
was used, including helicopters, boats, and cars.
The procedure used in the Myanmar assessment involved 
many steps and activities, beginning with the collection of 
A VTA workshop , facilitated by then VTA Programme Manager, Mr Richard Blewitt. Photo by AHTF Coordinating Office
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The assessment analysed information on disaster effects in a 
total of 79 townships located in Ayeyarwady, Yangon and other 
affected Divisions, and the macro-economic analysis covered 
the entire country with special reference to the Ayeyarwady 
and Yangon Divisions for which the system of national accounts 
provides adequate coverage. The team analysed data sector by 
sector with the team leaders and an economist, in consultation 
with a Government counterpart.
The PONJA did not constitute a recovery plan, which would 
have required further work to refine sectoral needs and 
priorities, elaborate recovery approaches and implementation 
arrangements and complete and refine estimates of costs. 
However, as part of the assessment, an initial identification 
of recovery costs was completed for some of the principal 
recovery activities across sectors. Around 90 percent of all 
recovery costs estimated – all those except transport and 
communications — were for activities delivered directly to the 
local community level.
The storyline for the PONJA was led by the DALA, which was 
drafted before the VTA was fully analysed. However, there was 
no contradiction in sectoral data between the VTA and DALA, 
except in housing.
As part of the DALA, innovative qualitative research was 
undertaken to assess the impacts of Cyclone Nargis on aid 
delivery, the village economy and livelihoods, and social 
relations and local institutions. This research formed the basis 
for the subsequent Post-Nargis Social Impacts Monitoring (see 
below).
Summary
Donors at the pledging conference in Yangon identified 
access and a thorough assessment of needs on 25 May 2008 as 
the key prerequisites for increased funding. The PONJA went 
beyond fulfilling these two needs.
The PONJA successfully integrated humanitarian relief 
assessments with a longer-term recovery assessment, along 
with integrating micro and macro information. The VTA worked 
and, when combined with the DALA, provided a powerful tool 
for humanitarian and recovery practitioners, policy-makers, 
national governments and donors. One of the benefits of the 
information being endorsed by all parties was that findings 
became an agreed baseline that all agencies could work from, 
making them easy to use and quote.
Damage And Loss Assessment Training
7 8 9 10
June July
11 16 1517 21 22 725
Initial Data Collection
Field Survey of Affected Areas
Continued Data Collection and Analysis
Presentation and Validation of Assessment Results
Completion of First Draft
Presentation of Final Ponja Report
Figure 7: Timeline of Events for the DALA
Source: PONJA report
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Secondly, the credibility of the findings mobilised 
much-needed funding. On 21 July 2008, on the occasion of the 
41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore, ASEAN and the UN 
jointly launched the final PONJA report. The results fed into a 
revised Flash Appeal, launched in New York on 10 July, which 
requested US$482 million for the first year of the response.
Thirdly, the PONJA findings were accepted by the 
Government, which then provided the international community 
with greater access to the Government and opened up 
communication lines.
Challenge: At the beginning of PONJA there was a debate 
about how to capture the results from the two types of 
assessments in the report in order to present a balance of 
immediate humanitarian assistance with early to longer-term 
recovery activities since this was the first time that two 
methodologies were employed in a post-disaster needs 
assessment (PDNA). It was eventually agreed that the findings 
from both would be integrated sector by sector and presented 
along a timeline of needs covering the spectrum from relief 
to recovery, and representing both micro- and macro- 
perspectives.
Lessons Learned: Based on, among others, the experience 
of the PONJA, the UN and the World Bank, together with the 
European Commission, signed a Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis 
Assessments and Recovery Planning on 25 September 2008. 
Combining the two approaches used under PONJA, the 
assessment process mentioned therein seeks to identify and 
capture the needs of the people, the damages to physical assets 
and infrastructure arising from a disaster, and the subsequent 
economic losses caused by the event, as well as identifying the 
social and community level dimensions and sectoral aspects of 
recovery needs.
Challenge: One of the greatest challenges was the large 
coverage area and the basic nature of technology available.
Lesson Learned: It was through the strong cooperation of 
multiple parties that the logistical challenges were overcome. 
Under the auspices of the TCG, and in cooperation with the 
Logistics Cluster, the PONJA used a total of 24 helicopter 
flights, 214 car trips, 158 boat trips, 52 motorcycle trips, 40 
CDMA phones, 35 Global Positioning System (GPS), and 32 
computers. The core assessment teams managed and organised 
the logistics and movements of all the teams. However, the 
assessments would not have been completed to schedule 
without the use of the helicopters, which were primarily used 
for relief efforts.
Challenge: As the database was a work in progress and field 
staff had not received extensive training, there were many 
errors in the VTA data-entry process.
Lesson Learned: A pre-programmed data entry system that 
matches a pre-designed questionnaire requiring basic skills 
would have prevented so many mistakes from being made.  
Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically, referring to a roster 
of surge staff with database management skills would have 
resulted in a good quality and specific database.
Challenge: Developing the VTA multi-sector questionnaire 
required a lot of negotiation as each Cluster wanted their 
indicators to be included in the report, often requiring 
data collection methods that were not conducive to a rapid 
assessment.
Recommendation:  While indicators may vary by disaster 
or from one country to the next, many indicators can be 
standardised and popularised to facilitate comparisons.
Furthermore, guidance for the country Cluster Lead is needed 
from the Global Cluster Leads on:
•	 The criteria for defining and selecting indicators;
•	 What an “indicator” is, what is a question, and what is 
“information”;
•	 A set of sample indicators for each Cluster as a basis for 
local selection and adaptation, with a range of potentially 
useful questions linked to each set to be used directly in a 
questionnaire;
•	 Where to turn for further guidance for each sector, such as 
websites and contact details for available expert technical 
advice.
An assessment team sets off into the field. 
Photo by AHTF Coordinating Office
32 Post-Nargis Needs Assessment and Monitoring ASEAN’s Pioneering Response
Challenge: Initially, there was a concern that the Government 
might not have available up-to-date data appropriate for 
the DALA team. This required the DALA team to invest more 
in the triangulation of data as compared to other countries 
where disaster-related data are more readily available and 
institutionalised.
Lesson Learned:  The DALA exercise gave the Government 
an opportunity to learn about and apply the damage and 
loss assessment methodology. The DALA helped develop a 
solid working relationship between Government officials and 
their counterparts on the international assessment team. As 
a result, the DALA team was able to access the store of data 
that ministries had collected on a range of sectors. Once 
triangulated with other sources, this data was very useful for 
the DALA exercise.
Conducting the PONJA: A Practical Reference
The PONJA has shown that methodology is critical to the 
success of any needs assessment. It ought to fit with the phase 
of the emergency as well as the funds and the time available. 
Some of the important lessons from a Cluster perspective 
include:
•	 Balance the need for timeliness and the need for a 
technically robust assessment. Ensure that the best 
possible information is provided in a timely fashion to 
decision-makers, taking account of the requirements of all;
•	 Ensure that all questions and data collected are relevant 
and useful;
•	 Remember that information that is “good enough” is 
adequate and do not seek more detail or precision than 
necessary;
•	 Analyse and use pre-existing data before undertaking a 
needs assessment;
•	 Do not reinvent the wheel in every country. The content 
of questions and indicators used should be based on core 
areas of inquiry and comparability;
•	 Make sure the assessment provides a baseline for 
monitoring.
In the same vein, the design of any assessment should be 
based on a confluence of decisions and considerations such 
as the precise purpose of the assessment; what will be done 
with the information and who will do it; the sources of the data 
(who has the information); the geographic and topical areas 
to be covered; the skill level of the individuals who are going 
to collect the data; the reporting format for quantitative and 
qualitative data; and the timeframe for when the results will be 
required.
Conducting the Village Tract Assessment: A 
Practical Reference
As a follow-on multi-sectoral assessment, a VTA-type 
assessment should provide more detailed information relevant 
for many sectors, based on larger and more representative 
samples than the initial rapid assessments conducted in the 
immediate days following an emergency. It should establish 
baselines for monitoring progress and may complement 
additional in-depth sectoral assessments that are needed to 
plan responses beyond the initial, acute, life saving phase.
The number of field teams should be determined by 
workload and time alloted for data collection. Teams should be 
created to reflect:
•	 A variety of language capacity (English, Myanmar and 
local regional dialects);
•	 Knowledge of local area;
•	 A mix of genders;
•	 A mix of ethnicities.
Field teams should ideally be given sufficient training by 
technical experts in the respective fields. This will allow the 
Clusters to be more involved with the process of not only tool 
development, but also to ensure that the data collection is 
more in line with what their respective Clusters require.  Field 
teams should pilot the data collection tools before they use 
them in the field.
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In addition, a detailed field guide should be written for 
Enumerators, who then can use it as a handy reference to 
guide them through steps such as what to say when entering 
a community, standard operating procedures for handling the 
completed questionnaires in a secure and confidential way and 
definitions used in the questionnaire.
As much planning for logistics should be done prior to 
sending teams to the field, as teams have little time to plan 
and respond once in the field. For example, any agreements 
for logistics support from other agencies and government 
authorities can be clarified and agreed on in advance and 
detailed maps can help to identify and plan pick-up and 
drop-off locations.  The team should be trained to use and be 
equipped with detailed maps, particularly those from township 
authorities, and appropriate telecommunications and GPS tools 
to facilitate their navigation.
Depending on the size of the coverage areas, it may be 
necessary to establish field-based hubs in which teams can 
work while in the field.
Spatial sampling has many advantages. It allows sampling of 
villages without having their population figures and guarantees 
equal opportunity for both small and large communities to be 
included in the sample. Spatial sampling methodology ideally 
requires reliable, yet not necessarily detailed, maps in order 
to help identify the specific locations to be sampled. Often 
times, these types of maps may not be available, in which 
TCG members listen to the daily progress report made by the Control Room on the 
conduct of PONJA. Photo by AHTF Coordinating Office
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case, the best estimation based on consultation with trusted 
regional authorities may suffice or, barring that, equally spaced 
coordinates may be selected to find the village nearest to the 
coordinate using a GPS.
Data collection should be done using multiple tools; 
household-level questionnaires, key informant interviews, focus 
group discussions and observation checklists, or a combination 
of these, depending on the type of disaster and the context. 
Different information may be gathered when the same question 
is put to groups and to individuals in order to triangulate the 
results. It is important to understand the social context, for 
example,  how the society works at the smaller community level. 
While it may not be possible to obtain a truly ‘representative’ 
view, consultation with women as well as with men, and with the 
relatively powerless as well as with leaders, should be minimum 
requirements of a focus group discussion assessment.
A multiple sector questionnaire requires consultation to 
ideally achieve buy-in from the Clusters, who, along with 
donors and the government of the affected country, should 
use the results. The questionnaires need to undergo translation 
and back translation by independent translators twice and 
evaluated in the pilot survey.
As the volume of data is often large for surveys at this 
post-disaster stage, procedures must be followed to limit 
human error at every stage that the data is handled, starting 
from when the Enumerators leave the Hub to travel to the 
selected village right through to the data-entry and analysis 
stages. For instance, papers ought to be checked to ensure they 
are in order, and at the household, checks should be made to 
ensure all questions were addressed. Data should be entered 
twice and merged to limit the data-entry errors if paper 
questionnaires are used, or regularly backed up if electronic 
handheld devices are used.
Devising an analysis plan, when the data collection 
instrument is being designed, is essential to ensure 
cost-effective data collection. A statistician for each Cluster 
should assist with the analysis and interpretation of their Cluster 
information. In the analysis stage, weights should be used to 
adjust potential over-sampling in smaller townships when the 
township findings are included in the larger sample analysis.
Those who collect the data should be part of the analysis 
and additional technical experts should be called in to 
help interpret the data to ensure that evidence is provided 
for all conclusions and that data is interpreted taking into 
consideration its context.
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When making recommendations, the following issues need to 
be considered:
•	 What kinds of estimates are needed and when: by village, 
province, overall, for specific sub-groups? Should absolute 
numbers or proportions of the affected population be 
used?
•	 What benchmarks should be used, and which baseline? 
•	 How should sectors be prioritised?
Conducting a Damage and Loss Assessment: A 
Practical Reference
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) originally developed the DALA 
methodology in the early 1970s. This methodology has been 
continuously expanded upon and updated over the past three 
decades, and in recent years was simplified and customised for 
application in different regions of the world. It has been applied 
by the World Bank and other international organisations in 
numerous cases of recent disasters, and provides a satisfactory 
framework to identify and quantify the socio-economic and 
environmental impact of disasters.
Guidelines and tools for the DALA can be found in the ECLAC 
Handbook3. The general steps include the following:
1. Collection of baseline information from appropriate 
government agencies and ministries, as well as other 
sources, and of preliminary assessment reports;
2. Training of government personnel, and other interested 
parties, on the damage and loss assessment methodology 
developed by ECLAC;
3. Field survey of affected areas to gather information and/or 
verify data already collected;
4. Assessment of social and economic impact of disaster;
5. Formulation of recovery and reconstruction programmes.
In the context of the international partnerships on 
post-disaster assessments mentioned above, the UN and the 
World Bank are currently finalising the PDNA thematic guidance 
for sectoral assessments and recovery planning, which will 
provide the basis for the more effective implementation of and 
cooperation in such important exercises.     asean
Basic equipment and necessities for DALA team. Photo by AHTF 
Coordinating Office

Periodic Review
After the successes of the initial VTA and DALA assessments that presented the initial 
needs after Cyclone Nargis, the PONJA made the 
recommendation that the situation should be 
monitored. From this recommendation, the TCG, 
jointly overseen by ASEAN and the UN, launched two 
monitoring projects, namely the Periodic Review (PR) 
and the Social Impacts Monitoring (SIM) study, with 
different objectives.
Using the VTA as the baseline study and building 
on, while improving its methods, the PR set out 
to describe the progress or lack of progress in the 
affected area over the recovery period. Four PR 
assessments were conducted and written up in 
reports. The second one, PR II and subsequent PRs 
set their results in the context of the Post-Nargis 
Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP).
According to the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the 
PR, the objectives were to:
1. Monitor indicators at regular intervals in 
order to contribute to the stated goal;
2. Gather information to provide a snapshot of 
the progress of the recovery of households 
and communities;
3. Provide information that would guide the 
strategic decision making amongst all 
relevant stakeholders.
The ToR was a reflection of one of the priority 
functions of the TCG, adopted at the second TCG 
Meeting on 2 June 2008, to ensure monitoring and 
reporting coordination:
1. Ensure smooth flow of information related to 
international and national relief efforts among 
all parties involved; 
Chapter Three 
Review and Monitoring
A PR enumerator 
interviews a villager. 
Photo by AHTF 
Coordinating Office
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2. Establish mutually-acceptable mechanisms for monitoring 
the delivery and accountability of international assistance 
to the Cyclone-affected areas; 
3. Conduct further detailed assessment and analyses of the 
current situation in the entire affected areas; 
4. Facilitate the coordination of periodic assessments and 
analysis of the recovery efforts for those living in affected 
areas (added at the 33rd TCG meeting on 7 April 2009).
Four PR assessments were carried out over a two-year period 
in Myanmar:
•	 PR I: November 2008 (6 months after Nargis);
•	 PR II: May 2009 (12 months after Nargis);
•	 PR III: November 2010 (18 months after Nargis).
•	 PR IV: May 2010 (24 months after Nargis).
Methods
The overall management of the PR was supported by the TCG: 
ASEAN, the Government, and the UN, which also represented 
the IASC community. The PR team endeavoured to include 
all three components of the TCG at every stage and in all 
processes.  
Outside of the formal coordination structure of the Clusters 
and Working Groups, the PR involved the three components of 
the TCG in other ways. Stakeholders, in particular, were involved 
in a number of ways including:
1. Sector Consultations: Through the system of the 
Clusters and then Working Groups, the PR had extensive 
consultations with the various programme sectors, 
including Health, Education, Food Security and 
Livelihoods, Protection, Shelter, and WASH. The PR had 
a strong philosophy of following a consultative and 
transparent process that gave all three TCG components 
ample opportunity to provide input into the process.  
2. Operational and Logistic resources:  ASEAN, the 
Government, UN organisations and NGOs all generously 
provided logistical resources such as boats, cars, staff and 
office space.
3. Resource Mobilisation: In addition to the in-kind inputs 
provided for these assessments, a range of donors 
financially supported the PR.
4. Open Forum discussions: Weekly (PRI) and bi-weekly 
(PRII) open forum meetings were held in which the wider 
humanitarian community discussed the progress of the PR 
and gave suggestions.
5. Advisory Groups: ASEAN, the Government and the UN 
were equally represented in the Strategic Advisory Group 
and the Technical Advisory Group. These Groups provided 
guidance to the Programme Manager and the Technical 
Advisor within the PR team.
6. Mentoring positions were created for appropriate 
technical Government staff to fill in the interest of building 
capacity. 
The initial guidelines from the TCG for a monitoring 
assessment such as the PR were based on the PONJA’s VTA 
design. Specifically, the TCG requested that the new survey 
should use the VTA as a baseline, thus continuing data 
collection on some of the indicators used in the VTA and on 
multiple sectors using spatial sampling over the same area.
The PRs were conducted every six months and followed a 
similar schedule each time. The consultation process was just as 
thorough at each stage, especially since there is usually a high 
turnover of staff after an emergency. Thus the PR endeavoured 
to gain a sense of ownership by the community for each 
assessment. Clusters and Working Groups were made aware 
of schedules ahead of time as much as possible, in order to 
maximise their input. While there were some variations, each PR 
consisted of the steps shown in Figure 8.
With variations between the four PRs, there was a core 
team consisting of a Programme Manager, who managed 
an Operations Coordinator, a Technical Team Coordinator, 
Finance and Administration Coordinator and a Communications 
Officer. Technical experts were hired on a surge-basis as 
additional skills were required and may have included a Writer, 
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Figure 8: Schedule Followed by Each PR
Weeks
Tools Development (Consultative Process)
Planning
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 13 14 15 16 17 18 198 9 2010 1211
Recruitment and Training of Field Teams
Pilot Testing and Refining Tools
Data Collection/Fieldwork
Data-Entry
Data Analysis
Report Writing
Editing, Proofing, Printing, Dissemination
PR enumerators sample and map households. Photo by AHTF Coordinating Office
Source: PR I - IV
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Statisticians, Database Manager/Programmer, GIS Specialists, 
a Chief Analyst, Proofreaders, Graphic Designer and an Editor 
(Version Controller).  
From the onset, area Hub offices facilitated the assessments. 
There were four main Hubs in Bogale, Laputta, Pyapon, and 
Yangon that were initially managed jointly by UN and ASEAN. 
Labutta Hub covered 4 townships, Bogale Hub and Pyapon 
Hub each covered three townships and Yangon Hub covered 19 
townships. 
In addition to an international Hub Coordinator, the Hubs 
were usually staffed with national Hub Officers, Administrative, 
Logistical and Data Assistants. PR II put in place data checkers 
and assessment officers to ensure more consistent quality of 
data between Hubs. The Data Checkers improved the quality of 
the data immeasurably, as they addressed issues related to the 
completion of the questionnaire, such as illegible handwriting, 
omissions in the questions and pages of questionnaires, 
multiple answers when only one was permitted and ranking of 
responses. They addressed broached issues in daily briefings 
with the Enumerator teams through the Team Leaders/
Supervisors.
The spatial sampling methodology used in the VTA was 
repeated in the PR. As demonstrated by Figure 9, it selected 
communities that were equally distributed over the entire 
Cyclone-affected area, thus accounting for the heterogeneous 
nature of the disaster that swept up the coastline from the 
rural Delta to urban areas. The sampling method guaranteed 
even spatial coverage of the sample with small and large 
communities equally likely to be included in the sample. The 
results were then visually displayed for severity of impact by 
darker and lighter areas, which allowed for strategic planning, 
as well as prioritising the allocation of limited funds.
The number of communities sampled was reduced from more 
than 100 hexagons in PR I and PR II, to 56 hexagons in PR III and 
PR IV by doubling the size of the hexagons. The sampling area 
remained the same as the VTA (30 townships) and the number 
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Figure 9: Spatial Sampling Frame for the PR over the Nargis-Affected Area
Source: PR IV
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of households sampled in each community totaled 20 to 25. 
The number of questions increased steadily in each PR, starting 
with 94 questions in PR I to 111 questions in PR II, 133 questions 
in PR III and 155 questions in PR IV.  
Despite the halving of sample size between PR II to PR III, a 
closer comparison of population averages showed considerable 
stability. Over 80 per cent of 33 indicators remained comparable 
across PR II and PR III, with a variation of the mean within 6 
percentage points, suggesting that the values were closely 
fluctuating around a population mean.
The multi-sectoral questionnaires (see WEBSITE) were 
developed in consultation with the sectors (through the Cluster 
system and Working Groups) and were piloted before the 
assessment began. Questionnaires covered the following areas:
•	 Agriculture and Livelihoods;
•	 Cross-cutting sectors including the Protection of Women 
and Children, migration, vulnerable populations, and 
Disaster Risk Reduction;
•	 Education;
•	 Food Security;
•	 Health;
•	 Housing/Emergency Shelter;
•	 Nutrition, and;
•	 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene.
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After each phase of data collection, workshops were held to 
derive lessons learned by the field teams on operations as well 
as the implementation of the questionnaire. These workshops 
provided useful inputs to the improvement of subsequent 
PR processes, as well as the design of the questionnaire itself 
including the cultural relevance of the questions, the quality of 
translations, the flow of the interview, and its ability to access 
information about the most vulnerable groups. 
As a result of consultations with the Clusters and Working 
Groups, questions and indicators were changed to respond 
to new issues that arose after each PR. For example, the 
wealth index was dropped, indicators were added to assess 
the water crisis in PR II, and Disaster Risk Reduction questions 
were increased and improved in PR IV. In addition, indicators 
and questions were refined from one PR to the next. Overall, 
indicators and questions gradually improved from PR I to PR IV 
and the sectors benefitted from close participation in the PR 
processes.
In summary, all the indicators that worked and were relevant 
were retained, and those that did not exist yet were deemed 
relevant by the sectors were created. Adjusting indicators over 
the four PRs was necessary for two reasons: firstly, some of 
the questions did not work in practice despite being piloted; 
and, secondly, new indicators were needed to reflect changing 
priorities from the emergency to recovery phase.
A PR II emunerator conducts a shelter assessment with the help of the community. Photo by AHTF Coordinating Office
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Periodic Review III emunerators interview villagers. Photo by AHTF Coordinating Office
Given the different needs of the end-users such as the 
Government, donor agencies and implementing agencies, the 
PR continuously sought feedback on its process and its data 
presentation in order to improve its usage. As a result, the PR 
team added on new dimensions of analysis to the later PRs 
and presented data in new ways. For example, visuals such 
as tables, maps, graphs, were added with more explanations, 
comparisons of data were included between reviews thus 
illustrating direction, and data for the more vulnerable 
sub-groups was analysed.
Summary
The TCG was very successful in using the PR for strategic 
decision-making amongst all relevant stakeholders. The 
PR contributed to the legitimisation and standardisation of 
information on needs in the Delta, while initially increasing 
access to rural populations. The PR helped to build trust and 
increase collaboration with the Government, giving all parties 
of the TCG shared goals and channeled support from the 
highest levels of all stakeholders.
For donors, the PR series was very effective as a strategy 
document, allowing high-level decision-makers to see where 
the sectoral needs were. Even when PR results indicated that 
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need did not change very much between PR II and 
PR III, many donors regarded that not as a failure 
of humanitarian actors as much as a need for 
continued funding to the Delta recovery efforts.
Implementing agencies used the PR findings 
to substantiate the basis for programmatic 
decisions, to direct or redirect their programmes in 
accordance with the needs reported, and it assisted 
sectors in deciding where additional in-depth 
assessments were required. From the Government’s 
perspective, the PRs served as reliable and credible 
documents providing a comprehensive overview of 
the situation, which they could reference.
The PR demonstrated some best practices that 
should be replicated in future needs assessments 
and monitoring missions. They can be described as:
1. Consultative - by including stakeholders at all 
levels at all stages of the PR, it permitted the TCG 
and the larger humanitarian community to own 
the product; 
2. Comprehensive - data included multiple sectors 
and covered a large geographical area;
3. Household-focused - needs were assessed from 
a household point of view;
4. Confidential - strict protocols were in place for 
handling sensitive data from households;
5. Informative - for high-level strategic 
decision-making;
6. Reflective - every effort was made to integrate 
lessons learned from each exercise in the 
subsequent PR and;
7. Consistent - tracking of baseline indicators over a 
two-year period.
Periodic Review emunerators reach far and 
isolated areas. Photo by AHTF Coordinating 
Office
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A PR II emunerator conducts a nutrition assessment. Photo by AHTF Coordinating Office
Challenge: The PR’s mandate from the TCG was to report 
on changing perceptions of needs among households, not 
to document the attribution of changes over time as a result 
of aid inputs or to track the provision of services over time. 
This objective was not always understood by implementing 
agencies that wanted to know the impact and extent of aid 
delivery in the Delta.
Recommendation:  In addition to the PR, a parallel study 
could have been conducted under the TCG to identify the gaps 
in aid delivery.
Challenge: Many implementing agencies wanted to use 
the PR data before it was released in the final report. This was 
easier in PR I and PR II, as the PR reported to the TCG and the 
Clusters regularly, but as the TCG eventually began to meet less 
frequently, alternative means to share information was needed.
Recommendation: Sharing of real-time information could 
have been done by establishing a mechanism for information 
sharing between the PR teams and the Hub teams, who were 
responsible for tracking routine information on the Delta and 
reporting it up through the Recovery Coordination Centre, 
which was established during the time of PR III and PR IV.
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Challenge: The consultative nature of the PR made it 
vulnerable to a great deal of requests and criticism. The sheer 
volume of demands made it difficult for the PR team to provide 
sufficient and timely rationale for why input was not included, 
causing frustration among some sectors.
Recommendation: The PR could manage expectations better 
by communicating more strongly and more frequently that it 
may not be able to provide feedback for all inputs provided and 
it should share more widely and routinely what the PR is not 
meant to do. The PR for example, was not meant to:
•	 Be a Financial Tracking System;
•	 Replace sector-specific surveys, but rather aimed 
complement them;
•	 Replace the Who What Where product provided by the 
MIMU;
•	 Provide impact and gaps analysis on aid provided;
•	 Assess the performance of agencies.
Challenge: “Shadow positions”, created as a capacity 
building exercise for the Government, were activated for all PR 
assessments for a Statistician, a Social Scientist, a GIS Specialist 
and a Writer, but not all these positions were filled or filled 
appropriately. This was mainly due to financial incentives that 
were not sufficient to attract the highest quality of staff.
Lesson Learned: To attract staff who have the appropriate 
level of qualifications for shadow position, a more generous 
financial package should be provided.
Challenge: The PR recruited surge capacity staff only on 
short-term contracts, thereby increasing administrative 
burdens, and reducing staff incentive to remain, resulting in the 
loss of institutional memory and skill-sets.
Lesson Learned: The PR team could have recruited their 
surge capacity staff continuously from PR I to PRIV using a 
single fixed contract, thus retaining PR-specific acquired skills, 
knowledge and experience.
Challenge: The PR tried to remain neutral and meet its 
objective of collecting information impartially without aiming 
to influence donors to fund one sector more than another 
by, for example, prioritising. As a result, the assessment 
reports presented the results in a descriptive style, rather than 
being prescriptive in its recommendations or analytical in its 
interpretations.  However, many implementing agencies and 
especially donors asked for more prescriptive conclusions with 
firmer recommendations.
Lesson Learned:  The PR should consistently convey its 
objective that, while it will seek to make data more user 
friendly for end-users and particularly implementing agencies 
by adjusting and refining its methods of data analysis and 
presentation, it will adhere to a neutral stance in terms of 
advocating donors to fund any one sector. A recommendation 
would be for the humanitarian community to conduct 
workshops around the results presented in the Reports with an 
aim to take the results forward.
Conducting a Periodic Review: A Practical 
Reference
A PR is a continuous monitoring tool based on quantitative 
household surveys that provides a complete overview of 
evolving needs from a household perspective across a range of 
sectors.
See  for an illustration of the time needed to complete a 
single PR exercise.
A management unit should be set up and operating 
autonomously of any one agency, with support from multiple 
stakeholders, to carry out a complex range of tasks. This 
requires good planning and management of implementation, 
including mobilising funds and human resources, training field 
research teams, managing and coordinating logistics and field 
operations, and assuring rapid, reliable reporting and data 
processing and analysis.
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A core team should include the following positions: a 
Programme Manager, who manages a Technical Task Manager, 
an Operations Coordinator, a Logistics Coordinator and a 
Communications Officer. The technical teams are hired on a 
surge-basis to complete a PR exercise and include: a Writer, 
Statistician, Database Manager/Programmer, GIS Specialist, a 
Chief Analyst, Proofreader and Editors. 
The appropriately skilled people from the Clusters should 
train enumerator teams, and the questionnaire should be 
piloted. As with the VTA, a comprehensive field guide should be 
available for Enumerators to use as a reference to guide them 
through their enumeration steps, such as what to say when 
entering a community, how to look after the questionnaires in 
a confidential and secure way, and describe clear definitions 
for terms used in the questionnaire (see www.aseanhtf.org/
periodicreview.html). The training should include logistics, 
finance and administration, and map navigation using a GPS.
All appropriate documents should be secured from 
the government in advance and, while maintaining the 
confidentiality of the survey location, permission should be 
sought for full access to the survey area. Teams should be 
informed of their next survey destination only on the day prior 
to departing, with a minimal number of the logistics staff aware 
of the exact survey location.
Household sample sizes should ideally stay uniform 
throughout the reviews conducted, so as to ensure higher levels 
of comparability between them.
It is important to be realistic and select indicators that can 
feasibly be collected in a valid manner by generalists with 
little training. Indicators should be specific, relevant, useful, 
reliable, accurate, cost-efficient, and able to be communicated 
effectively to decision-makers. Proxy indicators may be used, 
where appropriate.
Given the lack of familiarity many local communities have 
with questionnaires, questions need be culturally relevant 
and sensitive. Field staff ought to be well trained in the art of 
probing when answers are not forthcoming. The PR results were 
based on quantitative household surveys. While these resulted 
in rich information, quantitative data should be analysed 
against qualitative information derived from sources such as 
key informant interviews in order to triangulate the results.
Multiple dimensions of analysis are needed to make sense 
of such a large amount of data gathered. This can include: 
a) the use of visuals such as tables, maps, graphs with more 
explanation of them; b) comparison of data between reviews; 
c) comparison of data by townships; and, d) analysis of data for 
more vulnerable sub-groups. Analysis should be comparable 
over the monitoring periods, while showing cumulative 
progress against the original baseline measured.
Social Impacts Monitoring
The Social Impacts Monitoring (SIM) initiative built on the 
social impacts assessment undertaken during the PONJA, 
and was included as part of the monitoring infrastructure 
approved by the TCG. The SIM was carried out on the premise 
that a dynamic understanding of how natural disasters affect 
local patterns of life, social structures and institutions is 
important in order to holistically understand their impacts. 
Such understanding is vital for developing effective plans for 
delivering post-disaster assistance.
The social impacts of natural disasters and subsequent 
recovery efforts are dynamic, changing in response to a 
range of factors, including levels and types of aid provided, 
government policies and actions, and the choices of affected 
communities and individuals. As such, in order to ensure 
recovery programmes are effective and to avoid negative 
impacts, social impacts are tracked over time. There are few 
other examples where the social impacts of a natural disaster 
have been studied to the extent they have been in Myanmar 
post-Cyclone Nargis.
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Out of the PONJA, a set of hypotheses around social impacts 
was formulated in July 2008 to identify the potential long-term 
impacts of the disaster. They included the following:
1. Nargis would have regressive impacts with those in 
supporting occupations likely suffering more than 
those with land in the short-term, possibly balanced by 
increasing labour demand once recovery was underway;
2. A redistribution of land away from small–scale farmers 
to those with larger holdings posed a risk, but likely on a 
small scale;
3. The relief response ran a real risk of further indebting 
affected villagers and increasing poverty in the medium to 
long run;
4. Inter-village relations – Relationships between villages 
would improve after Nargis likely in the short-term, but 
the impact would vary over time depending on the place;
5. Religion and ethnicity – Relationships between ethnic 
and religious groups potentially would worsen due to 
inequities in aid provision depending on the nature of the 
relief and recovery effort;
6. Nargis would not likely weaken social capital, making 
it more difficult for communities to recover; rather, 
the potential would be greater for social capital to be 
strengthened.
Dr William Sabandar, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of ASEAN for Post-Nargis Recovery in Myanmar (right) and 
Senior Advisor for Coordination, Institution Building & Partnership Said Faisal discuss critical needs by sectors during their 
humanitarian coordination visit to Bogale, December 2009. Photo by AHTF Coordinating Office
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Based on the hypotheses, the TCG recommended that 
social impacts be monitored over time, as many of the 
impacts of Cyclone Nargis on the social fabric could not be 
seen in the immediate aftermath. Thus, three qualitative 
surveys were undertaken in a sample of 40 villages across 
eight most affected Delta townships over a two-year 
period following the Cyclone.
Under the umbrella of TCG, the World Bank’s Global 
Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery funded SIM I 
and SIM II with financing from Australia, Norway and 
Sweden. SIM III was funded through another World Bank 
administered trust fund. 
Methods
A local NGO, a think tank and research organisation, 
conducted the fieldwork with technical support from the 
World Bank. The methodology for the SIM was developed 
by the World Bank in conjunction with the local NGO, 
based on discussions that took place with a range of local 
and international partners during PONJA as well as during 
the preparation of each of the three rounds of assessment.
The TCG provided strategic direction, and each round of 
SIM was presented to the TCG from concept stage to final 
product. The TCG reviewed each final draft before it was 
published in English and Myanmar languages. An informal 
team of peer reviewers, including members of local and 
international NGOs, UN team members and academia 
reviewed the SIM findings. 
Three SIM studies were carried out over the last two 
years in Myanmar:
•	 SIM I: November 2008 (6 months after Nargis);
•	 SIM II: June 2009 (approximately 13 months after 
Nargis);
•	 SIM III: April 2010 (approximately 23 months after 
Nargis).
Children do their 
homework in May 
2010. Photo by AHTF 
Coordinating Office
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The methodology proved robust and was only slightly 
adjusted from SIM I to SIM II and SIM III. SIM II included a 
dedicated credit market analysis in the eight townships while 
SIM III placed an additional focus on community institutions; 
both these areas were covered in less depth in the previous 
rounds.
All rounds of SIM were carried out in 40 villages. They were 
selected according to the following criteria:
1. Distribution across the eight most severely affected 
townships;
2. Variation in predominant village livelihood types 
(farming or fishing, peri-urban); farming villages were 
over-sampled due to the larger number of farming 
villages affected by Nargis;
3. Variation in the degree of initial affectedness by Cyclone 
Nargis.
Figure 10: Detailed Schedule Followed by a SIM Study
Each SIM round took an average of about four months to 
prepare and carry out, as demonstrated by Figure 10.
The SIM, focusing as it did on a limited number of villages, 
had a lean team structure. It relied on one lead researcher, who 
oversaw four field teams, each of which consisted of one team 
leader and two or three researchers.
The field researchers were all experienced in conducting 
social analysis in Myanmar. They represented a mix of ethnic 
and religious groups, and there was an equal ratio of women 
to men on the teams. Many of the researchers worked on 
more than one round of SIM, which allowed them to establish 
a relationship of trust with the villagers and further their own 
skills, leading to increasingly high-quality research.
The SIM employed social analysis tools: focus group 
discussions, key informant interviews, case studies and 
participant observation. The method was first tested on a few 
villages, then reviewed and adjusted before being expanded to 
the remaining the villages. The teams of local researchers spent 
two or three days in each village, with additional time allocated 
for travel.
Weeks
ActivitiesStage
Pilot of Field Guide in Circa 4 Villages
Revision of Field Guide, Orientation of Field Team
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 13 14 15 16 17 18 198 9 2010 1211
Revision to Field Guide and Intensive Training 
in Analysis and Reporting 
Field Work in Circa 18 Villages
Debrief and Preparation of Village Reports
Field Work in Circa 18 Villages
Debrief and Preparation of Village Reports
Coding, Inputting Data into Spread Sheet,
Preliminary Trend Analysis
Report Finalisation for Submission
Pre-testing
Preparation 1
Preparation 2
Phase 1 Field Work 
Debrief 1
Phase 2 Field Work
Debrief 2
Initial Data Analysis
In-depth Analysis
and Report Drafting
Source: SIM
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Villages in the sample were selected such that around half 
of them were assessed in the PRI. In terms of affectedness by 
Cyclone Nargis, approximated by the number of people who 
died per village, the 40 sample villages were close to the Delta 
average. While findings from SIM are representative only for 
the villages where fieldwork was conducted, triangulation 
with other data sources suggests that the findings were 
representative across Nargis-affected areas.
The researchers selected respondents to include a wide 
cross-section of villagers, including: the village head and other 
official village leaders; village elders and religious leaders; 
others who were involved in aid decisions; farmers, fishermen, 
labourers and those in other occupations; (potentially) 
vulnerable groups, including female-headed households, 
disabled or injured people and the elderly; and young men 
and women. To the extent possible, the researchers attempted 
to solicit perspectives from each group on the same topics in 
order to triangulate the information received.
The three SIMs focused on the same topic areas in order to 
allow for an assessment of the evolution of conditions over 
time. The SIM looked at three focus areas:
1. Aid effectiveness: This analysed the recovery effort at the 
village level as experienced by affected villagers. It looked 
at how much and what types of aid people were getting, 
needs and shortfalls, how assistance was being targeted 
and delivered, how aid decisions were made and how 
complaints were resolved.
2. Socio-economic impacts: This examined the ongoing 
impacts of Cyclone Nargis on key occupational groups 
such as farmers, fishermen and casual labourers. It looked 
at issues such as livelihoods, debt and credit and coping 
mechanisms.
3. Social relations and institutions: This explored how 
Cyclone Nargis and the subsequent aid effort had affected 
social capital, the capacity for collective action, group 
relations within villages, inter-village relations, relations 
among villagers and their leaders.
A Delta villager proudly displays the produce 
from her plantation, May 2010. Photo by AHTF 
Coordinating Office
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Understanding such social impacts and dynamics is vital 
for developing effective plans for delivering post-disaster 
assistance. Well-designed programmes that draw on local 
capacities and are built on an understanding of local realities 
can not only address key needs, but also strengthen local 
institutions and practices in ways that enhance development 
and social cohesion.
The analysis, demonstrated by the framework in Figure 
11, examines the social impacts of Cyclone Nargis at the 
community level pre- and post-Cyclone Nargis for the relief 
and recovery phases:
•	 The direct social impacts of the Cyclone, early relief 
efforts, and community responses;
•	 The longer-run social impacts of external longer-term 
recovery responses.
SOCAL RELATIONS
• Social Capital
• Social Divisions
 and Relationships
AREAS OF
VILLAGE LIFE
• Livelihoods
• Land and 
 Water rights
• Debt
• Migration
INSTITUTIONAL
AND LEADERSHIP
• Government
• Informal leaders
 and organisations
CYCLONE NARGIS
AND
EARLY RECOVERY
LONG-TERM
RECOVERY
PROGRAMMING
The interview guide was slightly adjusted over time: 
questions that no longer provided useful information were 
dropped, while others were added to improve understanding 
of issues that evolved over the previous rounds. Additional 
analysis of the credit market was carried out at the township 
level in SIM II, while a more in-depth analysis of community 
institutions was carried out in SIM III.
The analysis framework used by the SIM started from an 
understanding that disasters have an impact on the social 
fabric of affected communities. Analysing how Cyclone 
Nargis affected local patterns of life, social structures and 
institutions was important to holistically understand its 
impacts. For example, social cohesion may be strengthened as 
community bonds tighten to face the challenges of survival and 
rehabilitation; or it may be strained, as groups or individuals use 
the disaster to try to strengthen their position or wealth at the 
exclusion of others.
Figure 11: SIM’s Analytical Framework
Source: SIM
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Summary
For donors and implementing agencies, the SIM provided a 
more in-depth understanding of the impacts of Cyclone Nargis 
and the ensuing aid on the social dynamics within communities.
Its findings on the credit market and the increasing debt of 
rural households were particularly well-received by agencies, 
many of which have already been alarmed at the worsening 
situation and wanting to address it through informed 
programming.
The post-Cyclone Nargis economic and social dynamics that 
played out included increasing debt burden of poorer villagers, 
the increasingly prominence of local leaders in the recovery 
effort, and the budding empowerment of women in village 
life. Consequently, there is a need to continue to track the 
longer-term effects of Cyclone Nargis on the village society and 
economy, identify emerging good practices across communities 
and aid providers, and share lessons.
Through the SIM, a standard post-disaster toolkit was 
developed that incorporates social impacts analysis into the 
early stages of a post-disaster needs assessment and response. 
Indeed, the SIM method was refined and applied in the 
Post-Disaster Needs Assessment after typhoons Ondoy and 
Pepeng in the Philippines in November 2009.
Challenge: Both the PR and the SIM were outcomes of the 
PONJA, and meant to complement each other as monitoring 
exercises in the two years following the Cyclone. For instance, 
about half of the villages selected in SIM overlapped with those 
selected in PRI, and joint discussions carried out as the research 
methodologies were developed. There was regular interaction 
between PR and SIM teams during the first two rounds of SIM, 
when the World Bank had a person on the ground liaising with 
TCG members. The two teams shared draft reports of each 
round. However, there was room for greater harmonisation of 
messages. 
While the men fish, their wives mend the nets. Photo by AHTF 
Coordinating Office
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Recommendation: More effort could have been put 
into coordinating the two exercises, especially with 
respect to the consolidation and dissemination of the PR 
and SIM findings for each overlapping round.
Challenge: The SIM provided important analysis, 
especially about the aid sector’s impact on communities, 
and identified areas in which the aid sector could be 
improved. A significant number of publications were 
distributed in Yangon, to ministries and through the 
Hubs. The reports were posted on the ASEAN website. 
Furthermore, the project team participated in several 
workshops to present the results and used the reports to 
brief aid agencies working on livelihoods as well as donors 
that were involved in Myanmar or considering getting 
involved. And yet, there was a sense that the SIM findings 
were not as widely shared with end users through, for 
instance, discussion workshops. The SIM findings possibly 
could have had more impact.
Lesson Learned: Over time, the SIM disseminated 
its findings more systematically to aid providers and 
agencies. Given the widely accepted usefulness of the 
analysis, these efforts merit strengthening in the future. 
Conducting a Social Impacts Monitoring 
Exercise: A Practical Reference
The SIM is typically conducted to meet two objectives:
1. To assess the effects of a natural disaster on village 
social and economic life and local institutions as well 
as determine immediate needs.
2. To monitor the response of communities to the 
disaster over time in terms of socioeconomic 
recovery, social relations and institutions and aid 
effectiveness, with a view to identifying emerging 
challenges and prioritising aid interventions.
A nutrition assessment is conducted by PR 
enumerators on a child. Photo by AHTF 
Coordinating Office
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Social research is location-specific, therefore it is essential 
that the guidelines be reviewed and adjusted to a specific 
post-disaster context.
A SIM can be broken down into the steps shown in Figure 12.
Researchers should spend two to three days in each village 
to allow for in-depth data collection, with additional time 
allocated for travel. Each field team ideally should comprise 
three to four members.
Given the need to probe for nuanced understanding of 
social dynamics, the research team should be experienced in 
conducting social research. The composition of the team should 
reflect the various identities in the area to be studied, such as 
ethnic and religious groups, and there should be a balanced 
ratio of women to men on the team.
The SIM employs social analysis tools: focus group 
discussions, key informant interviews, case studies, and 
participant observation.
The tools ought to be tested first on a few villages, then 
reviewed and adjusted before being expanded to the 
remaining villages.
In conducting a SIM, the sampling should be representative 
of a number of dimensions, including:
1. Distribution across the areas the most severely affected by 
the disaster;
2. In proportion to the prevalence of livelihood groups 
across the affected areas; and,
3. Diversity in the degree of affectedness by the disaster.
Subsequent rounds of SIM ought to use the same sample 
of locations because it allows for the comparison of data over 
time, and thus provides a more detailed picture of the effects of 
the disaster on village society and its economy.
In order for researchers to be able to triangulate information 
received, a wide range of informants should be interviewed. 
These include formal and informal village leaders, vulnerable 
households, women, livelihood groups and youth.
A SIM can cover various focus areas. The following areas (and 
key questions) proved to be effective for the post-Cyclone 
Nargis social impacts monitoring:
Figure 12: General Schedule Followed by a SIM Study
Weeks
First Round of Field Work And
Write-up of Notes: 3 Weeks;
Training of Research Teams, Pre-test
and Finalisation of Field Guide: 3 Weeks
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 13 148 9 10 1211
Second Round of Field Work
and Write-up of Notes: 3 Weeks;
Data Analysis and Report Writing: 6 Weeks.
Source: SIM
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Aid effectiveness examines the aid response to identify 
weaknesses in how aid is delivered against international good 
practices for effectiveness, transparency and accountability. It 
gauges independence, self-sufficiency and capacity-building, 
the impact on the most vulnerable and efforts to strengthen 
communities.
Key questions include: 
•	 What humanitarian and recovery assistance has reached 
the village since the last round, and how?
•	 What are the key needs in the village?
•	 Who are the poorest groups, and are they receiving aid?
•	 Is information about aid and benefits shared, are decisions 
made openly?
•	 Who in the village plays a major role in decision-making 
and delivering development assistance?
Socio-economic changes and challenges examine the 
ongoing impacts of the disaster on key occupational groups 
such as farmers, fishermen and casual labourers and researches 
issues such as livelihoods, debt and credit, land tenure, 
occupational changes, and coping mechanisms.
Key questions include: 
•	 Have there been any changes in livelihoods in the village?
•	 Have the different livelihoods in the village been restored?
•	 How does debt affect people’s livelihoods?
•	 What are people’s livelihood coping strategies?
•	 What are the key institutions that support different 
economic groups?
Social relations and institutions explores how the disaster 
and the subsequent aid effort have affected social capital, the 
capacity in villages for collective action, group relations within 
villages (among gender, age, religious and ethnic groups), 
inter-village relations and relations among villagers and 
their leaders. It also reviews how local level institutions have 
changed and their role in shaping recovery. 
Key questions include:
•	 Is the village unified in all aspects of development and 
social life?
•	 Have there been any conflicts in the village since the last 
round of fieldwork, and how have these been resolved?
•	 Which are the important village level development 
institutions, and how is their role changing?
•	 What are the key social challenges facing the village?
Field teams should prepare the following reports as part of 
their data analysis process:
•	 Village data sheets;
•	 Village summary reports to include a summary of key 
issues arising from the data collection process;
•	 Institutional reports and case studies such as narratives on 
village institutions and their relationships to each other, 
including case studies from the villages; and
•	 Interview reports with detailed information from the focus 
group discussions and key informant interviews.
The Lead Social Researcher, in consultation with the field 
teams, should then consolidate this information.     asean
A WASH project beneficiary in Saluseik 
village, Labutta. Photo by AHTF 
Coordinating Office.

Recovery Information 
Accountability System
The TCG prioritised the Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP) with the 
PONREPP Prioritised Action Plan to the end of July 
2010. The Plan covered needs in Education, Health, 
Livelihoods, Shelter, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, 
with cross-cutting issues of Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Environment. The PONREPP Prioritised Action 
Plan, broken down by sector, budgeted activities at 
US$103.5 million.  
The Post-Nargis and Regional Partnership 
Conference (PONAC) was hosted by ASEAN on 
25 November 2009. It gained great support from 
the donor community for post-Nargis recovery 
and mobilised an approximate US$88 million, 
which is over 85 per cent of the US$103 million 
appeal. Pledges came from Australia, the European 
Commission, Denmark, Germany, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, the Netherlands, Singapore, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, amongst others. At the 
conference, promise was made that all donations 
would be tracked from funding to the physical 
outputs using one system. Following the Conference, 
ASEAN made efforts to follow up with donors in 
order to turn pledges into commitments and to track 
the transfer and use of those funds.
This system, called the Recovery Information 
Accountability System (The RIAS), tracked donor 
funding that was pledged at the PONAC, as part of an 
overall feedback loop that tracked sources of funding 
to the outputs. The concept of RIAS was developed 
from the recovery information system created by the 
Indonesian Agency for the Post-Tsunami Recovery of 
Aceh and Nias (BRR). It was called the Recovery Aceh 
and Nias Database and aimed to monitor the flow of 
the funds from donors to the beneficiaries during the 
post-tsunami recovery of Aceh and Nias.
Chapter Four 
Information System
Assessment teams 
ensure they always 
have at their disposal 
communication tools, 
safety equipment, 
GPS instruments and 
maps. Photo by AHTF 
Coordinating Office

(1)Nursery project in Myar Thar Wa village funded by Denmark, implemented by GRET. (2) Rain water collection tank in Boe Kone village funded by 
Australia and implemented by Save the Children. (3) Selected project site for shelter reconstruction in Pyi Taw Tar village. UN Habitat planned to replace 
these shelters with  newly constructed shelters funded by New Zealand. (4) School-cum-cyclone shelter in Aung Hlaing village funded by Switzerland 
Government, implemented by SDC. (5) Hospital-cum-shelter at Pyin Sa Lu town funded by the Government of Indonesia through the Government of 
Myanmar. (6) School construction in Kyait Latt town funded and implemented by the Government of Japan. (7) Hospital construction in Daw Nyein village 
funded by the Royal Thai Government implemented by Thai Red Cross. (8) New shelter at Chaung Twin village funded by the Government of Singapore, 
implemented by IOM.
1 2 3
4
7
5 6
8
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The RIAS was a database containing detailed, up-to-date 
information about everything from funding status to project 
delivery based on information that was received from donors, 
trust funds, implementing partners and the project tracking 
system. RIAS was designed to provide information about funds 
pledged and released by sectors, the status of funds released by 
donors, the status of funds released to implementing partners, 
the status of funds released to trust funds, a summary of 
achievements, donor profiles, trust fund profiles, implementing 
partner profiles and other information as deemed necessary. 
RIAS also linked GPS coordinates of each project with the 
Google Earth mapping system.
The Delivery Unit of AHTF Coordinating Office was equipped 
with GPS training and captured progress on the ground 
through regular field visits to each of the registered projects. 
The Delivery Unit established regular communication with 
donors to update the status of aid delivery. A complete list of 
project tracking activities was stored in the PONAC database 
called Protrack (from Project Tracking) and was updated 
monthly.
To share this information to all stakeholders, a PONAC 
newsletter was launched to provide information to stakeholders 
on the delivery of the PONAC funds that had reached 300 
organisations by July 2010, including donors, the Government 
and implementing agencies.
Summary
The RIAS actively sought information from implementing 
agencies and donors. All information released was based 
on documented facts and figures, none of which was based 
on assumptions. All information was included with the prior 
consent of the respected parties.
Donors could access time-bound information that linked 
their funding to actual projects on the ground. For the 
Government, this was the most comprehensive tracking 
system for funding set against the PONREPP allowing it to 
follow the flow of funds as well as identify weaknesses in 
the funding system. Additionally, the system subsequently 
helped to confirm ASEAN as a credible facilitator in the larger 
humanitarian response. 
The Relief and Resettlement Department of the Ministry 
of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement was trained on 
how to manage this system prior to AHTF’s departure.  While 
the tracking system was for post-Nargis recovery, it had the 
potential for adaptation to meet other Government financial 
management needs. The Relief and Resettlement Department 
later used the system to monitor the progress on relief and 
recovery in other parts of the country following a subsequent 
major disaster that hit the country.
Challenge: Because this type of tracking can be quite 
resource intensive, and reporting agencies do not always 
provide information on time, RIAS staff faced delays in getting 
timely information. Furthermore, delays were exacerbated by 
the start of the monsoon season. In addition, details regarding 
project activities, project locations and delivery outputs 
from individual implementing partners were often delayed, 
as information had to be verified with the community and 
approved by the implementing partner before being uploaded 
into RIAS. Given the resource-intensive nature of this system, 
the Government may face difficulties in managing this system 
now that it has been handed over.
Recommendation: In order to support the Government 
in managing this system, there is a need to ensure that the 
Government has sufficient and well-trained human resources 
to continue to operate such as system. ASEAN may continue 
providing support to ensure that the capacity is in place to 
manage the system, and this can be done under the umbrella 
of AADMER implementation. The Government may also benefit 
from closer coordination and cooperation with the MIMU, 
which manages the Financial Tracking System under the UN.   asean
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The RIAS provides details about the status of 
projects and their respective locations, which 
is delineated according to donors.
Source: PONAC Delivery Update July 
2010 ( data as of 30 June 2010)
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Project locations funded by Danish Government
Project location funded by the Government of Australia
Project locations funded by Japanese Government
Project locations funded by Singaporean Government Project location funded by the Government of Switzerland
Project location funded by Royal Thai Government

Assessments and monitoring activities are essential after a natural disaster and 
Cyclone Nargis provided the opportunity for 
the humanitarian and development community, 
including ASEAN, to exercise a wide range of 
assessment and monitoring tools. The experience 
was pioneering on many fronts. Under the auspices 
of the TCG, unprecedented activities were made 
possible, which would not have happened otherwise, 
and credible data was collected that helped to 
target limited funds to activities in order to alleviate 
the suffering of the people in the Cyclone-affected 
areas.
Importantly, the support of donors to TCG 
assessment and monitoring activities was integral 
and the resulting reports allowed the humanitarian 
and development community to reference the same 
documents rather than relying on multiple agencies 
or Government figures, both of which may lack 
transparency in their methods.
In order to create credible reports that had 
multiple stakeholder buy-in, to which the 
international community could refer with the 
confidence, a supporting body like the TCG was 
necessary. If the series of assessments summarised 
in this publication were to be replicated elsewhere, 
the relief and recovery coordinating body should 
include the host government as well as the UN 
and the regional body, if possible. The early period 
immediately after a disaster, when agencies are all 
eager to complete their own assessments, is the 
most challenging point at which to coordinate a 
collaborate assessment. To replicate the success of 
post-Cyclone Nargis relief and recovery assessments, 
the respective government, with the support of the 
regional body, should take the lead in combining 
resources to create credible data to inform strategic 
decisions.
What made the exercises in Myanmar so unique 
was a full circle of needs assessments — from 
monitoring to evaluation—which were completed 
Lessons and 
Way Forward
Childern from 
Aung Chan Thar 
village, Bogale 
in May 2010. 
Photo by AHTF 
Coordinating 
Office
68 Post-Nargis Needs Assessment and Monitoring ASEAN’s Pioneering Response
and concluded with a workshop reviewing the progress 
and remaining needs (Post-Nargis Recovery Needs Review 
Workshop held at the end of July 2010 in Yangon). The 
consistency and stability of methods, indicators, sampling area 
and coordinating environment that persisted throughout the 
two years following the Cyclone is unprecedented. Since, other 
disaster contexts have attempted to use or partly replicate 
these needs and monitoring assessments with varying success. 
It is important for the international humanitarian community to 
build on the good examples and subsequent lessons learned in 
Myanmar post-Cyclone Nargis.
The assessments and monitoring work conducted during the 
post-Cyclone Nargis response were comprehensive in terms of 
the timeframe, providing assessment information starting from 
the early days after the disaster through to the handover and 
exit at the end of the mandate in July 2010. The assessments 
were also comprehensive in the geographical area they 
encompassed, the sectors that were examined and evaluating 
the progress made.
The assessment and monitoring activities were seen as 
credible for multiple reasons. The Government permitted 
unprecedented levels of access to the assessment teams. 
The assessment and monitoring activities, although varied in 
methods and processes, were transparent and consultative with 
all components of the TCG, namely the ASEAN, the Government 
and the UN system participating.
The lessons learned for post-disaster assessments and 
monitoring activities in Myanmar are lessons that could 
be applied regionally as well as globally. Pioneering and 
unprecedented activities were facilitated within the framework 
of the high-level partnership of the TCG, which permitted a full 
cycle of post-disaster assessments and monitoring exercises 
from initial rapid assessments to monitoring assessments 
and right through to the handing over of activities to the 
Government to continue coordinating recovery. 
One of the outcomes of the PONREPP 
Prioritised Action Plan, a school funded 
by Japan, a PONAC donor. Photo by 
AHTF Coordinating Office
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Examples of pioneering exercises carried out in Myanmar 
after Cyclone Nargis include:
•	 ASEAN’s first-ever deployment of the ASEAN-ERAT on 
mission;
•	 A joint post-disaster needs assessment (the PONJA), 
which combined for the first time ever two assessment 
methodologies that cover macro and micro needs in a 
PDNA;
•	 A multiple sector household needs assessment for the 
Clusters (VTA);
•	 A monitoring assessment at the household level, showing 
progress using the post-disaster assessment as the 
baseline (PR);
•	 Analysis of the situation presented spatially in a needs and 
monitoring assessment showing the heterogeneity of the 
disaster’s affects (VTA and PR);
•	 Assessing social impacts of a natural disaster in novel ways 
in Myanmar post-Cyclone Nargis (SIM);
•	 A monitoring system that tracks from the promise of 
funding to the output (RIAS).
Furthermore, social impacts analysis was systematically 
incorporated into a PDNA for the first time in the aftermath 
of Cyclone Nargis. The initial social impacts assessment and 
subsequent monitoring relied on qualitative research methods 
to assess aid effectiveness and the impacts of the disaster on 
livelihoods and coping strategies, social relations and cohesion, 
and local governance and accountability. The methodology 
was subsequently incorporated into the PDNA conducted in the 
aftermath of Tropical Storm Ondoy and Typhoon Pepeng in the 
Philippines in 2009, and a guide for its systematic application in 
future PDNAs is currently under preparation.
The success of these assessments and monitoring activities 
are timely, as the international humanitarian community, 
including ASEAN, are seeking to improve the standards 
of post-disaster information. Significant efforts were 
made internationally with the commitment of Multilateral 
Development Banks on 20 October 2007 to adopt, with the 
UN and other partners, a shared platform for post-conflict 
and post-disaster recovery planning and joint monitoring and 
results frameworks for post-crisis transitions.
Based on, among others, the experience of PONJA, the UN 
and the World Bank, together with the European Commission, 
signed a Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and 
Recovery Planning on 25 September 2008. Combining the 
two approaches used under PONJA, the report sought to 
identify and capture the needs of the people, the damage to 
physical assets and infrastructure arising from a disaster, and 
the subsequent economic losses caused by the event, as well 
as identifying the social and community level dimensions 
and sectoral aspects of recovery needs. Formalising this, the 
PDNA is the established approach for developing a recovery 
framework that describes the economic and human impact 
of a disaster, identifies the needs for short and long-term 
recovery and incorporates as a core principle the longer-term 
mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction and the restoration of 
human development.
As a result of its experience from the whole cycle of 
post-Nargis assessments and monitoring, ASEAN agreed as part 
of its AADMER Work Programme for 2010-2015 to develop a 
needs assessment strategy, including necessary tools, training 
package and partnership mechanism. ASEAN also intends to 
develop tools and training programmes to help ASEAN Member 
States to conduct an effective damage and loss assessment and 
develop an effective recovery coordination and monitoring 
system. Following lessons from the first deployment of ERAT, 
ASEAN is now putting in place the procedures to facilitate the 
deployment of ERAT and the necessary training programme to 
equip ERAT for future deployments.     asean
A small shop owner in Saluseik village, 
Labutta February 2010. Photo by AHTF 
Coordinating Office.
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1 Common Needs Assessment Summary Report, Merlin and 
Help Age, Bangkok, January 2009.
2 A “village tract” is the second lowest rural administrative 
unit in Myanmar, between the village and the township.
3 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(2003). Handbook for Estimating the Socio-Economic and 
Environmental Impact of Disasters, ECLAC, United Nations, 
second edition.
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
AADMER ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response
ADB Asian Development Bank
AHTF ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for the Victims of 
Cyclone Nargis
AOC Assessment Oversight Committee
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
DALA Damage and Loss Assessment
ECLAC United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean
ERAT Emergency Rapid Assessment Team
FTS Financial Tracking System
GIS  Geographic Information Systems
GPS Global Positioning System
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
IM Information Management 
km Kilometre
MIMU Myanmar Information Management Unit
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations
PDNA Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PONAC Post-Nargis and Regional Partnership Conference
PONREPP Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan
PR Periodic Review
RIAS Recovery Information Accountability System
SASOP Standard Operating Procedure for Regional 
Standby Arrangements and Coordination of 
Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response 
Operations
SIM Social Impacts Monitoring
TCG Tripartite Core Group
ToR Terms of Reference
UN United Nations
UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment and 
Coordination
VTA Village Tract Assessment
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
Government refers to the Government of the Union of Myanmar
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